Last talk about Securing Democracy at #enigma2021: @jackhcable speaking about "THE FULL STACK PROBLEM OF ELECTION

Let's imagine that elections use all the security measures security people have been advocating: risk-limiting audits, paper ballots, etc. Would people trust the elections more?
Jack would argue no. Most people don't understand this stuff and most of the claims people are making can't be disproven. And are massively bogus already.

Georgia did a full recount on paper ballots and it very much didn't stop people from doubting the election!
Are election security results in vain? The point of election security is to convince the loser they lost.

No! Have to focus on the whole stack, from election infrastructure to campaigns to people and mis/dis-informaton
One takeaway from the talk: the parts of the stack must work in tandem. Can't fight misinformation in a vacuum, but must build on other election security measures.
The voting process
* significant advances in recent years (e.g. paper ballots, risk-limiting audits, end-to-end verifiability)
* research needed in integrating these technologies
* expanding to mail-in voting?
But there's also internet voting
* we can't do it securely today [oh no voatz reference]
* we have to combat malware, authentication etc.
* if we could solve them, that would be great. But in the meantime voting has to be successful for everyone
* can improve accessibility through things like getting ballot online, filling it out, then returning through the mail
Election support systems
* less researched. Probably because they look boring
* Voter registration databases aren't working. Russians breached at least 2 states, targeted all 50 states
* little to no public scrutiny of these systems
* election night reporting -- this is a picture of one where there was a bug in reporting. [It was fixed but freaked a lot of people out]
A lot of the trouble with the security of election support systems is not that we don't know how to do it -- it's that we have to do it
Campaign security
* biggest unknown (see Sunny Consolvo's talk!)
* we must view campaign security as non-partisan and increase resources and services available
Public confidence
* major damage from domestic actors
* widespread mis/dis-information
* technical election security measures helps to debunk rumours floating around
Misinformation-fighting supply measures:
* platforms: downranking and deplatforming
* trusted institutions
* debunking & fact checks
Misinformation-fighting demand measures:
* media literacy
* increased civics education

[ Also note that @katestarbird will be giving a talk on misinformation don't miss it: https://t.co/a0PutRnHaI]
Let's fix election support systems!
* Much of this is applying security things we already know
[ Note: a lot of organizations have this problem 😭 ]
* engage in public research. Have a vuln disclosure policy so people can confidently help
Election security is a problem that can only be solved by working together: elections officials, security people, everyone

[end of talk]

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A THREAD ON @SarangSood

Decoded his way of analysis/logics for everyone to easily understand.

Have covered:
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2. Workbook
3. When to sell options
4. Diff category of days
5. How movement of option prices tell us what will happen

1. Keeps following volatility super closely.

Makes 7-8 different strategies to give him a sense of what's going on.

Whichever gives highest profit he trades in.


2. Theta falls when market moves.
Falls where market is headed towards not on our original position.


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He believes in a market operator, if market mover sells volatility Sarang Sir joins him.


4. Theta decay vs Fall in vega

Sell when Vega is falling rather than for theta decay. You won't be trapped and higher probability of making profit.
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Like company moats, your personal moat should be a competitive advantage that is not only durable—it should also compound over time.

Characteristics of a personal moat below:


2/ Like a company moat, you want to build career capital while you sleep.

As Andrew Chen noted:


3/ You don’t want to build a competitive advantage that is fleeting or that will get commoditized

Things that might get commoditized over time (some longer than


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After recorded music, the music itself became abundant and what became scarce was curation, distribution, and self space.

5/ Similarly, in careers, what used to be (more) scarce were things like ideas, money, and exclusive relationships.

In the internet economy, what has become scarce are things like specific knowledge, rare & valuable skills, and great reputations.