Last up in Privacy Tech for #enigma2021, @xchatty speaking about "IMPLEMENTING DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY FOR THE 2020
* Data users expect consistent data releases
* Some people call synthetic data "fake data" like
"fake news"
* It's not clear what "quality assurance" and "data exploration" means in a DP framework
* required to collect it by the constitution
* but required to maintain privacy by law
* differential privacy is open and we can talk about privacy loss/accuracy tradeoff
* swapping assumed limitations of the attackers (e.g. limited computational power)
Change in the meaning of "privacy" as relative -- it requires a lot of explanation and overcoming organizational barriers.
* different groups at the Census thought that meant different things
* before, states were processed as they came in. Differential privacy requires everything be computed on at once
* required a lot more computing power
* initial implementation was by Dan Kiefer, who took a sabbatical
* expanded team to with Simson and others
* 2018 end to end test
* then got to move to AWS Elastic compute... but the monitoring wasn't good enough and had to create their own dashboard to track execution
* it wasn't a small amount of compute
* ... it wasn't well-received by the data users who thought there was too much error
If you avoid that, you might add bias to the data. How to avoid that? Let some data users get access to the measurement files [I don't follow]
More from Lea Kissner
More from Tech
The entire discussion around Facebook’s disclosures of what happened in 2016 is very frustrating. No exec stopped any investigations, but there were a lot of heated discussions about what to publish and when.
In the spring and summer of 2016, as reported by the Times, activity we traced to GRU was reported to the FBI. This was the standard model of interaction companies used for nation-state attacks against likely US targeted.
In the Spring of 2017, after a deep dive into the Fake News phenomena, the security team wanted to publish an update that covered what we had learned. At this point, we didn’t have any advertising content or the big IRA cluster, but we did know about the GRU model.
This report when through dozens of edits as different equities were represented. I did not have any meetings with Sheryl on the paper, but I can’t speak to whether she was in the loop with my higher-ups.
In the end, the difficult question of attribution was settled by us pointing to the DNI report instead of saying Russia or GRU directly. In my pre-briefs with members of Congress, I made it clear that we believed this action was GRU.
The story doesn\u2019t say you were told not to... it says you did so without approval and they tried to obfuscate what you found. Is that true?
— Sarah Frier (@sarahfrier) November 15, 2018
In the spring and summer of 2016, as reported by the Times, activity we traced to GRU was reported to the FBI. This was the standard model of interaction companies used for nation-state attacks against likely US targeted.
In the Spring of 2017, after a deep dive into the Fake News phenomena, the security team wanted to publish an update that covered what we had learned. At this point, we didn’t have any advertising content or the big IRA cluster, but we did know about the GRU model.
This report when through dozens of edits as different equities were represented. I did not have any meetings with Sheryl on the paper, but I can’t speak to whether she was in the loop with my higher-ups.
In the end, the difficult question of attribution was settled by us pointing to the DNI report instead of saying Russia or GRU directly. In my pre-briefs with members of Congress, I made it clear that we believed this action was GRU.
