The first working day of the new UK-EU relationship. We're going to hear a lot this year from all sides (remain and Brexit in UK, EU, etc) using any possible scrap of evidence. But what we need to look for is trends, over time, so a few to think about in this thread... 1/

Obvious disruption or reduction to UK-EU trade flow. Here we may be thinking e.g. of a permanent 10% fall in traffic, or regular queues, or indeed no change. And apart from goods, the same with individual travel, for work, residence etc... 2/
As a reminder we're not expecting permanent scenes like those of the week before Christmas when borders were closed. But 5-10% reductions in UK-EU traffic would not seem to be out of line with economic forecasts of a hit to the UK economy. 3/
Then we'll need to look at whether UK-EU trade is being substituted by UK-non EU trade. This probably should happen to a degree, and in theory efficiencies could come this way. But its also possible that all UK trade falls, with the UK no longer an EU entry point. 4/
Inward investment is another key post-Brexit indicator. There isn't a single obvious data set here, but the impression of the last four years has been a fall off in manufacturing, but not in services, particularly tech. Continuation would suggest economy tilting to services. 5/
The some policy indicators. The first is UK regulatory divergence. There's a clear link between this and EU market access, see for example our emergency data adequacy while we don't change our rules. Financial services equivalence. So diverge or not? 6/
We'll hear a lot about Free Trade Agreements, but numbers are not a useful indicator. Better to ask what UK economic activity is facilitated that was not previously happening, or vice versa, what is now closed. So far we are heavily net negative because of Europe. 7/
In trade policy generally, another useful indicator is being able to do something difficult. There was talk before Christmas of a deal with the US to end their penalty tariffs on Scotch. Would have been an impressive win against the odds. Didn't happen. 8/
Doubtless folk will look at GDP, but that's going to be hard this year because of covid recovery, and I already have doubts over the interaction between this and financial services (not as bad as Ireland, but even so). But some of the detail of course interesting. 9/
Look, lorry queue! new investment announced 6 times over! will be a more fun game to play. But the reality is the UK economy is likely to change as a result of rising trade barriers to Europe, but how is unclear. Question of trying to read that. 10/ end

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We need to talk about UK politics. More specifically we need to talk about the absence of opposition to a no-deal Brexit risking Scottish independence, Northern Irish peace, the end of the mass market car industry, more expensive food, and damaged relations with US and EU 1/n


Project fear and the red wall. The first meaning that every serious threat, such as that of Nissan that their plant will be unsustainable, is dismissed with little discussion. The red wall, apparently so angry with Labour about the EU they are afraid to have a position. 2/

Because 'sovereignty' apparently. But a particularly nefarious form of sovereignty in which the normal kind of things you discuss in a Free Trade Agreement - shared rules, access to waters - become when discussed with the EU unacceptable infringements and threats. 3/

You note in the UK we aren't having a discussion on what level playing field rules or access to fishing waters might be acceptable. Or normal. Or even what we might want, like shared increased commitments on climate change. No, all rumours. Evil EU. Worse French. 4/

Those who follow closely see incredible briefings in the papers, like today claiming the EU demand for raising minimum shared standards was only raised on Thursday, treated as fact. This was known months ago. But the media too often just reports the spin as fact. 5/
Not the easiest to follow, but for those interested in the big picture of trade relations between US, EU and China this exchange between @alanbeattie and @IanaDreyer is an essential read. Real debate on key issues, and good points on both sides.


Also reading this from @gideonrachman on EU-China. My view (cynically?) - that EU-China is a deal that makes a lot of sense given a probably unresolvable trade policy superpower triangle with the US, and best for the EU to move while China will.

The US and EU roughly agree on China that it should do some things differently, but not really the details of what those are. Meanwhile the EU and US have long standing trade policy differences, which neither (or their key stakeholders) prioritise resolving.

For the EU, the China deal has sent a message to the new US administration, you can't just tell us what to do. And delivered some (probably marginal in reality) benefits to business. For China, this is the 3rd deal with EU or US in 12 months. Pretty clear strategy there.

The key assumption that lies at the heart of too much writing on EU-US relations is that the two should cooperate on trade. After 25 years of largely failing to do so, I'd suggest we might want to question that a bit more deeply.
So many stories of new barriers to trade between UK and EU, but you might be thinking at some point these will run out. The government is certainly hoping so. Well they may slow down, but trade relations and regulations are not static, and changes will lead to further problems.

The likelihood of continued trade problems for a £650 bn trade relationship is why there should be a huge cross-government effort led by the Foreign Office and Department for International Trade to put in place the necessary resources to seek best results.

There isn't.

So the UK's relationship with the EU currently consists of two not particularly good deals and no consistent effort to manage current problems or prevent future ones. Joint committees are a second order problem to putting in place the right internal structures.

But that's been the consistent UK problem in relations with the EU since 2016. Lack of focus on getting the right internal structures, people, asks, strategy, too much attention on being tough and a single leader.

News just in. This doesn't necessarily mean the right structure being put into UK-EU relations. I suspect Frost's main role is to ensure no renegotiations with the EU.

Also, wonder what this says about the PM's trust in Michael Gove?

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I just finished Eric Adler's The Battle of the Classics, and wanted to say something about Joel Christiansen's review linked below. I am not sure what motivates the review (I speculate a bit below), but it gives a very misleading impression of the book. 1/x


The meat of the criticism is that the history Adler gives is insufficiently critical. Adler describes a few figures who had a great influence on how the modern US university was formed. It's certainly critical: it focuses on the social Darwinism of these figures. 2/x

Other insinuations and suggestions in the review seem wildly off the mark, distorted, or inappropriate-- for example, that the book is clickbaity (it is scholarly) or conservative (hardly) or connected to the events at the Capitol (give me a break). 3/x

The core question: in what sense is classics inherently racist? Classics is old. On Adler's account, it begins in ancient Rome and is revived in the Renaissance. Slavery (Christiansen's primary concern) is also very old. Let's say classics is an education for slaveowners. 4/x

It's worth remembering that literacy itself is elite throughout most of this history. Literacy is, then, also the education of slaveowners. We can honor oral and musical traditions without denying that literacy is, generally, good. 5/x