Not the easiest to follow, but for those interested in the big picture of trade relations between US, EU and China this exchange between @alanbeattie and @IanaDreyer is an essential read. Real debate on key issues, and good points on both sides.

As promised, a little story. Of how the EU ask of the UK on the level playing field is indeed new, how that came about, and why we should have been able to deal with this a lot better. And how, indirectly, David Frost is one of the reasons. Beware, contains analysis... 1/

Let us go back 5 years to the height of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) discussions. As you may recall, by 2015 TTIP was about as popular in the EU as allegedly the EU is these days in the red wall. What, thought the EU and Member States, could be done? 2/

TTIP will be more popular, declared more than one insider, if we show there are tough labour and environment protections against undercutting by the nefarious and probably untrustworthy US. That, optimistically they said, will get NGOs on side. 3/

But there was a problem with EU level playing field provisions in 2015. The unit of DG Trade responsible absolutely did not believe anything should be enforceable. Pages of loose commitments, fine. Add more! But apparently enforcement was best done through a good chat. 4/

Now such soft-touch EU enforcement of level playing fields was probably designed particularly for developing countries, where sanctions were seen as unfairly penalising struggling business and individuals for the actions of a terrible government. Not the US. 5/

The first working day of the new UK-EU relationship. We're going to hear a lot this year from all sides (remain and Brexit in UK, EU, etc) using any possible scrap of evidence. But what we need to look for is trends, over time, so a few to think about in this thread... 1/

Obvious disruption or reduction to UK-EU trade flow. Here we may be thinking e.g. of a permanent 10% fall in traffic, or regular queues, or indeed no change. And apart from goods, the same with individual travel, for work, residence etc... 2/

As a reminder we're not expecting permanent scenes like those of the week before Christmas when borders were closed. But 5-10% reductions in UK-EU traffic would not seem to be out of line with economic forecasts of a hit to the UK economy. 3/

Then we'll need to look at whether UK-EU trade is being substituted by UK-non EU trade. This probably should happen to a degree, and in theory efficiencies could come this way. But its also possible that all UK trade falls, with the UK no longer an EU entry point. 4/

Inward investment is another key post-Brexit indicator. There isn't a single obvious data set here, but the impression of the last four years has been a fall off in manufacturing, but not in services, particularly tech. Continuation would suggest economy tilting to services. 5/

There is a sense of disbelief about the new trade problems between Great Britain and the EU / Northern Ireland. Which we need to lose. This is the new normal. And we face a difficult period of adjustment - immediate paperwork needs, and to longer term uncompetitiveness.

As we trade folk might have mentioned before, outside of the single market and the customs union of the EU, problems at borders are normal. Delays common. Great job of the Brexit supporters to find supposed experts claiming otherwise, but now back to reality...

Such delays at borders were in fact part of the origin of the single market, in the days when the Conservatives didn't see a contradiction between free markets and sovereignty. Such delays weren't really compatible with a supposed common market. So, the single market...

The delays and individual issues will ebb and flow. There will be new regulatory requirements in EU and UK affecting different products. But for UK and EU business as a whole it will mean UK-EU trade is more costly and less predictable, and there will be economic adjustment.

To put it bluntly, some UK firms will go out of business due to new border barriers. Some EU firms will stop supplying the UK, at a cost increase to UK consumers but a possible new opportunity for firms. This adjustment will take some time though.

So, deal or no-deal? I'm afraid it looks gloomy. Too many outstanding issues, a political context that is not conducive to compromise, and a tunnel leaking like mad. Quite possibly forming between them a vicious cycle. So, is this it? I suspect not... 1/n

Recall, this UK-EU negotiation is attempting to put in place an agreement unusually extensive (haulage, aviation, security, as well as trade) in a record timescale (9 months start to implementation) at a time of pandemic. That was always optimistic. 2/

A process driven EU against a naive yet overconfident UK in a short timeframe was also never going to be easy. In particular the UK's sole evident negotiating strategy, to say we'll walk away, is still in overdrive, making compromise harder. 3/

On the up side the UK has been inching slowly away from the purist notions of sovereignty which would prevent any deal towards a more realistic haggle over details, but possibly too late to resolve them, barring unexpected deep late concessions from either side. 4/

Geography isn't changing, and trading more with neighbours isn't either. Virtually all countries in the world have deals with their neighbours. It is unrealistic for the UK to be the sole developed country exception. Even if it takes a while. 5/

My friend @itsafronomics wanted to know the breakdown of student debt by income, so I pulled data from the SCF.

Student debt is more concentrated amongst high earners, but disproportionately amongst Black borrowers. The plot below plots the average within Income Quartiles.
1/n

But those are the averages. What's the share that's above 10k? (This is the Biden current cutoff for debt forgiveness, so a useful benchmark).

For comparison, 20% of white Americans have student debt, and 31% of Black Americans.

Let's contrast that with say, above 20k. I was surprised at how high the share remains.

When we get to 50k of student debt, or more, we see it's only about 5% of the US, and around 8% of Black Americans. Strikingly, it's a huge share of high income Black Americans (this is a known fact in the education literature, I believe).

So what does this look like put together? Overall, we see a higher share of Americans with debt above 10k, and 20k. We would cover a decent amount with 10k, but miss Black Americans especially.

🚨🚨 THREAD TIME 🚨🚨

let's talk about the differences between income, wealth, and class

tl;dr: income is earned, wealth is bought, and class is inherited

also hi friends, while on the topic of income, this work is my only source of it! times are tough and folks are really struggling, but if you have a couple extra bucks please consider sending a tip my way

💰 venmo rachel-kahn-5
💵 cashapp

INCOME is the amount of money a person makes from labor and investments

so if you work for 2,000 hours and are paid $40,000 in a year, that's income

OR if you have a $1,000,000 stock portfolio with a 5% return rate and cash out $40,000 of it, that's income too (fucked, right?)

WEALTH is the amount of capital you own

that could be owning a house and land worth $150,000

or owning a small business with $150,000 in assets

or owning $150,000 worth of stocks

wealth is the investments that are themselves accruing value

CLASS is about what you stand to inherit

in the united states we use a lot of weird doublespeak to avoid talking about the proletariat, the petit bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie directly

proletariat ~ working class
petit bourgeoisie ~ middle class
bourgeoisie ~ upper class