Ten days in and it seems the government's post-Brexit economic policy is to ignore reality, priority and choice, and just claim with no evidence that everything is going to be great. This, needless to say, is dangerous territory. Exhibit 1... 1/
Right now they don't. Big talk, little reality. Tough world. 12/ end
No US deal yet, instead we have the usual warm words about being deep in talks, and the CPTPP. But for what? If we get deals with Australia and NZ we'll have deals with 10 of 12 CPTPP countries. How will joining then help goods trade? And why goods, not services? 7/ pic.twitter.com/NaiUXr1y4f
— David Henig (@DavidHenigUK) January 12, 2021
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Not the easiest to follow, but for those interested in the big picture of trade relations between US, EU and China this exchange between @alanbeattie and @IanaDreyer is an essential read. Real debate on key issues, and good points on both sides.
Also reading this from @gideonrachman on EU-China. My view (cynically?) - that EU-China is a deal that makes a lot of sense given a probably unresolvable trade policy superpower triangle with the US, and best for the EU to move while China will.
The US and EU roughly agree on China that it should do some things differently, but not really the details of what those are. Meanwhile the EU and US have long standing trade policy differences, which neither (or their key stakeholders) prioritise resolving.
For the EU, the China deal has sent a message to the new US administration, you can't just tell us what to do. And delivered some (probably marginal in reality) benefits to business. For China, this is the 3rd deal with EU or US in 12 months. Pretty clear strategy there.
The key assumption that lies at the heart of too much writing on EU-US relations is that the two should cooperate on trade. After 25 years of largely failing to do so, I'd suggest we might want to question that a bit more deeply.
V good points but overall I stick with the conclusion that this is a v risky deal.
— Alan Beattie (@alanbeattie) January 5, 2021
1. It\u2019s overstating it to say that COM now has final say over investment. FDI screening remains a MS competency. COM has had to take a v secondary supporting role over Huawei and 5G.
1/n https://t.co/RVg2jnoFgK
Also reading this from @gideonrachman on EU-China. My view (cynically?) - that EU-China is a deal that makes a lot of sense given a probably unresolvable trade policy superpower triangle with the US, and best for the EU to move while China will.
The US and EU roughly agree on China that it should do some things differently, but not really the details of what those are. Meanwhile the EU and US have long standing trade policy differences, which neither (or their key stakeholders) prioritise resolving.
For the EU, the China deal has sent a message to the new US administration, you can't just tell us what to do. And delivered some (probably marginal in reality) benefits to business. For China, this is the 3rd deal with EU or US in 12 months. Pretty clear strategy there.
The key assumption that lies at the heart of too much writing on EU-US relations is that the two should cooperate on trade. After 25 years of largely failing to do so, I'd suggest we might want to question that a bit more deeply.
Going to have to disagree with my learned friend here. If anyone moved on level playing field it was the UK, on the principle of a ratchet, or tariffs for divergence which was still being denied midweek. Changing the way in this might be achieved (many options) is insignificant.
It is the same "I move in principle you move in detail" shift we saw with the Northern Ireland protocol last year, when no PM could accept a border between GB and NI suddenly did, just as recently no PM would accept tariffs for divergence and seems to have done.
So, are we at deal yet? No, and it remains far from certain, but better than the gloom of Saturday. I still think the PM wants his ideal where everyone is happy, still hopes if only he can speak to Macron and Merkel he could get it, still to decide.
And even if there is a deal it is now too late for either business to adjust to it, or the EU to ratify it according to normal procedure. In both cases you'd think we'd need an extension, but there is a big shrug on this whole question. Nobody knows.
And so, yet again on Brexit, we wait. In particular, those who actually do the trade, the businesses we rely on, are forced to wait for a formal outcome while preparing as best they can. Let's see what happens.
Fish was never a deal breaker. Level playing field was
— Mujtaba Rahman (@Mij_Europe) December 14, 2020
But LPF now more likely to come together after @EU_Commission move (on trade test for unlocking remedial measures & scope of arbitration over remedial measures)
If it does, expect deal on \U0001f420\U0001f421 too
It is the same "I move in principle you move in detail" shift we saw with the Northern Ireland protocol last year, when no PM could accept a border between GB and NI suddenly did, just as recently no PM would accept tariffs for divergence and seems to have done.
So, are we at deal yet? No, and it remains far from certain, but better than the gloom of Saturday. I still think the PM wants his ideal where everyone is happy, still hopes if only he can speak to Macron and Merkel he could get it, still to decide.
Second, I still maintain that Johnson has not made a decision here. Some days he leans towards Deal, sometimes towards No Deal
— Jon Worth (@jonworth) December 14, 2020
He has been stuck for weeks, and still is. He\u2019d ideally just not decide *anything*
And even if there is a deal it is now too late for either business to adjust to it, or the EU to ratify it according to normal procedure. In both cases you'd think we'd need an extension, but there is a big shrug on this whole question. Nobody knows.
And so, yet again on Brexit, we wait. In particular, those who actually do the trade, the businesses we rely on, are forced to wait for a formal outcome while preparing as best they can. Let's see what happens.
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1/OK, data mystery time.
This New York Times feature shows China with a Gini Index of less than 30, which would make it more equal than Canada, France, or the Netherlands. https://t.co/g3Sv6DZTDE
That's weird. Income inequality in China is legendary.
Let's check this number.
2/The New York Times cites the World Bank's recent report, "Fair Progress? Economic Mobility across Generations Around the World".
The report is available here:
3/The World Bank report has a graph in which it appears to show the same value for China's Gini - under 0.3.
The graph cites the World Development Indicators as its source for the income inequality data.
4/The World Development Indicators are available at the World Bank's website.
Here's the Gini index: https://t.co/MvylQzpX6A
It looks as if the latest estimate for China's Gini is 42.2.
That estimate is from 2012.
5/A Gini of 42.2 would put China in the same neighborhood as the U.S., whose Gini was estimated at 41 in 2013.
I can't find the <30 number anywhere. The only other estimate in the tables for China is from 2008, when it was estimated at 42.8.
This New York Times feature shows China with a Gini Index of less than 30, which would make it more equal than Canada, France, or the Netherlands. https://t.co/g3Sv6DZTDE
That's weird. Income inequality in China is legendary.
Let's check this number.
2/The New York Times cites the World Bank's recent report, "Fair Progress? Economic Mobility across Generations Around the World".
The report is available here:
3/The World Bank report has a graph in which it appears to show the same value for China's Gini - under 0.3.
The graph cites the World Development Indicators as its source for the income inequality data.
4/The World Development Indicators are available at the World Bank's website.
Here's the Gini index: https://t.co/MvylQzpX6A
It looks as if the latest estimate for China's Gini is 42.2.
That estimate is from 2012.
5/A Gini of 42.2 would put China in the same neighborhood as the U.S., whose Gini was estimated at 41 in 2013.
I can't find the <30 number anywhere. The only other estimate in the tables for China is from 2008, when it was estimated at 42.8.
