1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

2/ It highlights, as a win, that China’s preservation of existing liberalizations. That’s positive, but not really a big problem; the bigger issue is stagnation, where reform pledges have failed to materialize after years/decades of promises. Great example is in the FDI openings,
3/ which are highlighted to include cloud, auto, fin services etc—all areas of EU/MNC interest. Thing is, these openings aren’t new. China has begun opening auto/finance since 2018/19, while the 50% cap on cloud services has remained unchanged since 2015 (or before if we consider
4/ WTO ascension commitments vs the 2015 Telecom Catalogue, but that’s for another day). So these are existing openings that are repackaged as “wins.” More critical issue beyond FDI caps is around licensing issuance, which still big problem. Arguably some more significance in
5/ R&D and health? Not an expert, but the FDI conditions (eg hospitals only in certain cities) are limiting, while R&D could be complicated by data/info controls. It’s also unclear how existing tech transfer prohibitions exceed existing protections in the foreign investment law,
6/ nor how China will provide equal access to standards setting; that this keeps coming up in intl discussions/domestic policy pledges means it’s a longstanding issue, and it’s unclear how the CAI addresses structural issues underpinning that (eg forced IP localization). The lang
7/ around SOEs/subsidy disclosure is disappointing, considering how important an ask this was for the EU. W/o more detail on dispute resolution, unclear how SOEs can be forced to change here, especially bc things like procurement are conducted via back channels that disadvantage
8/ MNCs, or in the case of ICT, are swayed by domestic policy pledges (eg 安全可控) that come from political/diplomatic problems, not commercial issue. Tied to this, the fact that subsidy disclosure doesn’t *touch* the industrial sector avoids a huge problem area that now
9/ underpins a lot of retaliatory trade policy/pushback against globalization. Finally, if we look at the commitments on labour and environ, benchmark is again not backsliding—but what about *existing* issues around forced labour/XJ? Pledging to not allow labour standards
10/ to deteriorate further is from a very low base. Commitment towards working to ratify ILO conventions is also very different from being forced to do so. Finally, on enforcement and dispute resolution—the most key parts of any deal!!—the commitments seem similarly disappointing
11/ but we still need details on how this will work. Precedent w/ the US shows that China sees any framework for regular monitoring (and, potentially, punitive action) as a violation of sovereignty. Suggesting that enforcement might lack teeth. Overall, CAI looks like it slightly
12/ moves the needle on some issues, while leaving many others untouched. We still need to wait for final text to be released in order to do deeper analysis, but this suggests CAI will have a hard time going through European Parliament for ratification. (end)

More from Brexit

1/ A challenge in parsing Brexit news is that businesses are facing overlapping types of challenges that can be difficult to separate.

The key questions are:
1⃣ Given the model of Brexit chosen, could this have been prevented, and by whom?
2⃣ Can it get better?


2/ To put those another way:

"If you knew everything you needed to know and did everything right, is your existing business and delivery model still viable and competitive?"

The answer to that question determines if for you the problem is Brexit, or how Brexit was delivered.

3/ Some of the challenges at borders could have been prevented while still having the exact same model of Brexit (No Single Market, No Customs Union, but an FTA).

That they're appearing is an implementation failure and you can fully support Brexit but still be pissed about them.

4/ Examples include:

1) Government guidance and IT systems being ready earlier and/or easier to navigate;

2) More support for businesses, and more affordable bespoke help;

3) More time to prepare and better government communication about what preparation actually requires.

5/ This thread you've all seen from Daniel Lambert the wine merchant (primarily) deals with problems in this category.

There's no policy reason he can't export his product, but the procedures are a nightmare to navigate and he's badly under-supported.
A quote from this excellent piece, neatly summarising a core impact of Brexit.

The Commission’s view, according to several sources, is that Brexit means existing distribution networks and supply chains are now defunct and will have to be replaced by other systems.


Of course, this was never written on the side of a bus. And never acknowledged by government. Everything was meant to be broadly fine apart from the inevitable teething problems.

It was, however, visible from space to balanced observers. You did not have to be a trade specialist to understand that replacing the Single Market with a third country trade arrangement meant the end of many if not all of the complex arrangements optimised for the former.

In the absence of substantive mitigations, the Brexit winners are those who subscribe to some woolly notion of ‘sovereignty’ and those who did not like freedom of movement. The losers are everyone else.

But, of course, that’s not good enough. For understandable reasons Brexit was sold as a benefit not a cost. The trading benefits of freedom would far outweigh the costs. Divergence would benefit all.

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