Paying 50-100x earnings for 'blue ocean' sectors has become normalized with promise of changing trends and immense future opportunity. Stock markets look forward, if the future opportunity is great, in most cases that 100x valuation already factors a 30x valuation in 3 years.

@sohamdas Depends on your style, of course, but absolutely correct.

Every annual report tells a story.

In small companies, you can read between the lines to get a feel of the management style and business economics.

I take Fredun Pharmaceuticals Ltd (FPL) to illustrate how to go about this (it's not pretty).

Let's go 👇 (1/n)

Please note that the main objective of this review is to get a preliminary understanding without doing a thesis.

It is oriented towards a "quick and dirty" review to decide if you want to dig deeper.

Review financials on a screener website before reading further. (2/n)

Now, you can already guess Fredun Pharmaceuticals is named after Fredun Medhora. His mother, Dr Daulat Medhora and his father, Nariman Medhora, are the original promoters of the company. Interestingly, Nariman Medhora has stepped down from active involvement in June 2021. (3/n)

Then we have Dr Daulat Medhora, who seems to have the qualifications and a decent background in the pharma industry. However, she is 76 years old and unlikely to be actively involved for much longer. (4/n)

That leaves Fredun Medhora, who does not have a technical or scientific background and his primary qualification is an MBA.

The biography provided in the AR describes the CV of an MBA student, nothing on the contribution or role in the company. (5/n)

Insolvency resolutions suck for creditors, but this one takes the cake.

Listed company gave loan to related party, defaulted along with other dues. Related party creditor acquired the listed entity via insolvency.

Only losers are operational creditors w/ 88% haircut.

Company name is Covidh Technologies Ltd - really old bankrupt company. Not a significant event, just an observation.

Correction: Listed company *took* a loan from related party (in first tweet)

The anatomy of Private Equity (PE) funding in a public listed company.

A thread 👇 (1/n)

PG Electroplast Limited, a contract manufacturer of various kinds of electrical goods and appliances, recently announced an 80 crore fund-raise through preferential allotment of equity shares and compulsorily convertible debentures (CCD) to Baring PE and family funds. (2/n)

Such transactions are a great way to understand Private Equity deals in a public setting. Because of disclosure norms for listed companies, everything related to a fund infusion in a listed company is made available to the public. (3/n)

From a retail investor’s perspective, it is easy to focus only on WHO is investing. In this thread, I will try to look at such a transaction from the perspective of all stakeholders – the company, the PE investors, and the public shareholders. (4/n)

PG Electroplast sees an opportunity in the Productivity-Linked Incentives (PLI) by GoI. Under this scheme, companies making incremental investments into manufacturing facilities receive up to 6% of the incremental sales generated from such investment as an “incentive”. (5/n)

Bull runs in small caps are usually fast and furious, and the cycle repeats itself every 3-4 years. Every time, retail is sold stories of business turnaround and stock charts look fantastic for meteoric wealth creation. For the class of 2020-21, here's a couple of past stars.

These small cap stocks with 30-40 crore market cap went up 23X and 11x in a span of 24 months between April 16 and April 18. The story looked great then, but subsequently once liquidity and interest disappeared, the prices went right back to where they came from.

When in the thick of the action, it can be difficult to keep a level mindset. To keep the narrative believable, these companies are able to massage their top-line and bottom-line for a short period of time to show an imminent turnaround. Note the trends in these financials.

The company usually exhausts its ability to massage the financial statements very soon and the business health plummets dramatically. One collapsed so dramatically it has been selling fixed assets. The other one is Uniply Industries - a simple search on Twitter will suffice.

Newer small cap investors may be subscribed to many Twitter handles, Telegram channels, groups and even premium advisory services. Don't take anybody's word for the narrative being sold to you. On-the-ground-research and scuttlebutt can be plain fiction.

Accidents happens when one doesn't look at valuations.

A supposedly platform stock listed in 2019. OFS price was 320 Rs. High of 6396 made yesterday.

Mcap crossed 1 lac crore.

Company was affected by CoVid so will talk a bit on pre-CoVid nos.

1/3

Sales of 2300 cr in FY20. NP 730 cr. Company has a monopoly given by the govt. Business is good and many extensions taking place, which will take time to bear fruit, if at all. But valuation-wise it had gone bonkers.

2/3

Stock corrected 40%+ in 2 days. This is what can happen when one doesn't heed valuations. And ignores the risks to the business. And only looks at blue sky scenario.

A good company may not be a good investment, at any price.

3/3

1/ @mjmauboussin's book Expectations Investing is a masterclass in valuation & strategy

His framework uses price-implied expectations to assess companies, an elegant way to invert valuation

https://t.co/kESplMN3nW

To practice these concepts, I wrote a case study on Chipotle⤵️

2/ Chipotle is the leading fast casual restaurant chain across the US, with almost 3,000 owned & operated locations

They benefit from strong unit economics and a trusted brand

We'll discuss consensus estimates, competitive landscape, and expected

3/ We must first identify the price-implied expectations based on key value drivers

After finding the consensus estimates, investors can seek opportunities in the expectations - looking for a divergence from the market's assumptions

Let's start with Chipotle's sales growth

4/ Chipotle has grown revenues from $3.9B to $7.55B over the past 5 years, at a 5 year CAGR of 14.1%

Analysts estimate a 13.7% consensus growth rate based on 5-7% same store sales growth, 8% additional store openings per year, and steady digital sales contribution

5/ Next is operating profit margin, which measures profitability from core operations

Chipotle has slowly been growing its margin, now at 10.67%

Analysts expect high margins of 15.75%, with incremental profits from digital orders and unit-level margin growth contributing

💥

If you understand just this one quote, it will transform your investing journey...

So powerful...

#investing #compounding

1/ Howard Marks once said that before buying an asset, above anything, he wants to know “the amount of optimism that’s in the price.”

All investors can do this with a handy tool: The Reverse DCF.

I'll also leave a download link to my compact DCF Model at the end of this thread.

2/ We all know a regular DCF. But's what a "Reverse DCF"?

If we consider that a DCF is a Linear Equation, we could say the 'X' (The unknown variable) is the Intrinsic Value.

In a Reverse DCF, we start with the Market Price and try to find some other variable, say Sales Growth.

3/ Let's start by taking an example: VST Industries, a Cigarette-maker based in India.

I valued them on my blog a while ago. I'll be retaining the old assumptions, but using the latest financials.

So please note that the Valuation isn't accurate

4/ This is a "Regular DCF" of VST Industries. The Assumptions I've made indicate an Overvaluation.

The Intrinsic Value is Rs. 3,012, but the Market Price is Rs. 3,492.

Let's not dwell on whether this is correct, since we discussed earlier that this isn't an accurate Valuation.

5/ If we want to do a "Reverse DCF" instead, we need to pick a different variable to 'find'. Say, I will pick the Sales Growth numbers.

I will now remove the Sales Growth numbers from the Model and assume that Sales Growth is the same across the years for ease of calculation.

@soicfinance @suru27 Indeed. For later, industry/sector has to be within your circle of competence to judge the turnaround correctly.

Because according to Warren Buffett
"Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that turnarounds seldom turn"