2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:
Both the @ChathamHouse and @Policy_Exchange reports are excellent and leave a healthy tension to the UK foreign policy debate. I\u2019m left with two questions that won\u2019t go away. Is the first underestimating how the world has changed. Is the second overestimating Britain\u2019s capacity?
— Ben Judah (@b_judah) January 11, 2021
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
8. All of this based on a prosperity project drawing upon Asia’s emerging energy trade formats.
9. Because of the above, capabilities is an issue only if the UK’s tilt is seen outside of its crucially networked nature. The UK will enable and convene;
More from Brexit
It is time to talk Brexit and standards again. (thread)
Let's start off with: I don't think any trade experts are surprised by this. It is why the TCA did not do much on SPS. It is why the EU did not offer much on SPS. It is why the UK did not ask much on SPS.
But it also shows that the popular slogan "after Brexit we'll have the same standards as before, so why would anything change in trade" was wrong - and worse, it was purposefully trying to stifle a necessary debate.
And this leads me to the next point: I have no issue with changing the rules, I have a massive issue with how it is done. Here's what we should discuss:
The decisive question: What are the standards the UK as a country wants. To inform this debate, we need the following information:
London intends to make use of its costly SPS regulatory autonomy. As widely anticipated, first area of divergence expected to take place in the field of Crispr technology for genome editing, area where the UK has long argued for a more liberal stance.https://t.co/btRoxU3saZ
— Emily Rees (@emilyrees_eu) January 7, 2021
Let's start off with: I don't think any trade experts are surprised by this. It is why the TCA did not do much on SPS. It is why the EU did not offer much on SPS. It is why the UK did not ask much on SPS.
But it also shows that the popular slogan "after Brexit we'll have the same standards as before, so why would anything change in trade" was wrong - and worse, it was purposefully trying to stifle a necessary debate.
And this leads me to the next point: I have no issue with changing the rules, I have a massive issue with how it is done. Here's what we should discuss:
The decisive question: What are the standards the UK as a country wants. To inform this debate, we need the following information: