Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:

1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
7. Against this, the effort will be to look beyond longstanding ties (US and NATO) and understanding how far to push new relationships with countries like India, Vietnam, South Korea;
8. All of this based on a prosperity project drawing upon Asia’s emerging energy trade formats.
Truss announcement that the UK intends to apply to CPTPP Is a clear indication of this;
9. Because of the above, capabilities is an issue only if the UK’s tilt is seen outside of its crucially networked nature. The UK will enable and convene;
10. This leads to the capabilities question. The IP tilt requires a maritime strategy upgraded to the 21sr cent: one in which maritime capabilities converge with cyber and space ones - the 3 essential moving parts of a future global commons. The recent MoD package does just that;
11. In all, the debate that @b_judah so nicely presented in his thread is also, in a way, a debate over the soul of the UK: a soul torned between the reluctance to leave the investment of the last century behind and the risks in the one needed for the next one to work;
12. Fwiw, what I think is admirable is the fact that this is truly a debate about the Indo-Pacific and not just about China. It is a positive debate. It is a shaping debate. One the rightfully sits in conversation with the equally important China policy one. The game is on.

More from Brexit

Been waiting for 👇 🚨

Important story on what a “tariff-free” deal means in practice and why it’s not enough for two economies as closely integrated.

Tariffs are removed on goods that meet rules of origin. This is a complex and nuanced area of customs.

/1


Important to remember that trade deals (FTAs) weren't designed with such a high degree of economic integration in mind.

So some of the standard RoO provisions will seem incredibly restrictive under the UK-EU deal.

/2

Minimal operations or insufficient processing is a standard part of an FTA. Most, if not all FTAs, include a provision on minimal processing – processing not considered sufficient to confer originating status even if rules of origin have been met.

/3

It is standard procedure not to apply cumulation when goods have only been subject to minimal processing.

To be able to cumulate origin and consider the final product of UK origin, the processing carried out in the UK needs to exceed minimal operations.

/4

The level of integration between the UK and the EU means that this will have significant consequences for a number of industries.

For example, in supply chains where goods are brought into the UK from the EU and reassembled, sorted or repackaged and re-exported to ROI.

/5

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@franciscodeasis https://t.co/OuQaBRFPu7
Unfortunately the "This work includes the identification of viral sequences in bat samples, and has resulted in the isolation of three bat SARS-related coronaviruses that are now used as reagents to test therapeutics and vaccines." were BEFORE the


chimeric infectious clone grants were there.https://t.co/DAArwFkz6v is in 2017, Rs4231.
https://t.co/UgXygDjYbW is in 2016, RsSHC014 and RsWIV16.
https://t.co/krO69CsJ94 is in 2013, RsWIV1. notice that this is before the beginning of the project

starting in 2016. Also remember that they told about only 3 isolates/live viruses. RsSHC014 is a live infectious clone that is just as alive as those other "Isolates".

P.D. somehow is able to use funds that he have yet recieved yet, and send results and sequences from late 2019 back in time into 2015,2013 and 2016!

https://t.co/4wC7k1Lh54 Ref 3: Why ALL your pangolin samples were PCR negative? to avoid deep sequencing and accidentally reveal Paguma Larvata and Oryctolagus Cuniculus?