▶️ Standard stuff on commitment to competition, unbundling and customer choice
▶️ UK Capacity Market no longer needs to try to integrate overseas Capacity providers & vice versa
(Article ENER.6, Clause 3, page. 160)
2/
What's in the EU-UK Brexit deal on energy?
It may be Boxing day, but I've had a quick look
▶️ Standard stuff on commitment to competition, unbundling and customer choice
▶️ UK Capacity Market no longer needs to try to integrate overseas Capacity providers & vice versa
(Article ENER.6, Clause 3, page. 160)
2/
This means that these interconnectors can continue to sell capacity rights ahead of time, rather than all through close to real-time markets.
(Article ENER.11, page 162)
3/
▶️ But, UK cannot participate in EU procedures for capacity allocation and congestion management (more on this later)
(Article ENER.13, page 163)
4/
Not my specialist area, but is this because PRISMA isn't an EU institution (unlike electricity market coupling)?
https://t.co/5GQJtZDpTa
(Article ENER. 15, page 164)
5/
▶️ Security of Supply: Parties to cooperate, again not much detail. Can't see any references to a solidarity principle.
(Articles ENER. 16 and ENER. 17, page 165)
6/
- UK TSOs (i.e. National Grid) to cooperate with EU TSOs through cooperation with ENTSO-E and ENTSOG but not membership
- UK regulator (@Ofgem) to cooperate with EU regulators through ACER. Again, no UK membership
(Articles ENER.19+20)
7/
Looks like UK no longer a member of North Seas Energy Cooperation, so a new forum is needed.
(Article ENER 23, page 169-170).
See summary of our report on Future of North Sea :
https://t.co/Qgh8b2p0yZ
8/
THREAD: New @Policy_Exchange report \u201cThe Future of the North Sea: Maximising the contribution of the North Sea to Net Zero and Levelling Up\u201d by me, @benmcaleenan and @ed_birkett, foreword by Tees Valley Mayor @benhouchen. Key takeaways of the report: /1https://t.co/l0r46nKjmk
— Will Nicolle (@WRNicolle) November 3, 2020
Title on Energy ceases on 30 June 2026. Although can be extended to 31 March 2027 & again to 31 March 2028.
Seems linked to general termination provisions of the deal, including a reference to 🐟🐟 (Article FISH.17)
(ENER 33, p.172)
9/
Market coupling ceases on 1 Jan 2021. Will be replaced by April'22 with "Multi-region loose volume coupling"
New term for many https://t.co/oSVDDiWFw9
Annex ENER-4 p.784
10/
Creates a risk that interconnectors flow the "wrong way" (i.e. from high prices to low prices).
Algorithm is separate to EU day-ahead market coupling (EUPHEMIA)
11/
▶️ By April 2021: CBA and outline technical proposals
▶️ By November 2021: Technical proposals
▶️ By April 2022: System starts operating
p.785
12/
▶️ New Specialised Committee on Energy to discuss/implement some bits of the energy title and annexes (page 12)
▶️ Commitment to carbon pricing in the section on "level playing field"
[Title XI, Article 7.3, page 202]
13/
▶️ Lots of sensible provisions, much to gain for both sides
▶️ Market coupling will be weaker, even with new system (Apr 2022)
▶️ Welcome focus on North Sea
▶️ Need to understand more on termination provisions
See more in our recent paper:
https://t.co/KEXNIWvAHJ
14/14
THREAD: The key takeaways from our new @Policy_Exchange report: "The Future of UK-EU Energy Cooperation."
— Ed Birkett (@ed_birkett) September 28, 2020
1/8https://t.co/nfJFdO4GBY
More from Brexit
A quote from this excellent piece, neatly summarising a core impact of Brexit.
The Commission’s view, according to several sources, is that Brexit means existing distribution networks and supply chains are now defunct and will have to be replaced by other systems.
Of course, this was never written on the side of a bus. And never acknowledged by government. Everything was meant to be broadly fine apart from the inevitable teething problems.
It was, however, visible from space to balanced observers. You did not have to be a trade specialist to understand that replacing the Single Market with a third country trade arrangement meant the end of many if not all of the complex arrangements optimised for the former.
In the absence of substantive mitigations, the Brexit winners are those who subscribe to some woolly notion of ‘sovereignty’ and those who did not like freedom of movement. The losers are everyone else.
But, of course, that’s not good enough. For understandable reasons Brexit was sold as a benefit not a cost. The trading benefits of freedom would far outweigh the costs. Divergence would benefit all.
The Commission’s view, according to several sources, is that Brexit means existing distribution networks and supply chains are now defunct and will have to be replaced by other systems.
Brexit reality bites: The new dawn of trade friction via @RTENews https://t.co/p6VdlhZUAN
— Tony Connelly (@tconnellyRTE) January 9, 2021
Of course, this was never written on the side of a bus. And never acknowledged by government. Everything was meant to be broadly fine apart from the inevitable teething problems.
It was, however, visible from space to balanced observers. You did not have to be a trade specialist to understand that replacing the Single Market with a third country trade arrangement meant the end of many if not all of the complex arrangements optimised for the former.
In the absence of substantive mitigations, the Brexit winners are those who subscribe to some woolly notion of ‘sovereignty’ and those who did not like freedom of movement. The losers are everyone else.
But, of course, that’s not good enough. For understandable reasons Brexit was sold as a benefit not a cost. The trading benefits of freedom would far outweigh the costs. Divergence would benefit all.
