🇬🇧🇪🇺 Who caused Hard Brexit? Some thoughts from the perspective of a social scientist. In the last few days we have seen an interminable debate on whether Remainers, Soft Brexiters, or Hard Brexiters are responsible for Hard Brexit. And it’s a false debate. Why? 1/n
@Sime0nStylites @simonjhix @robfordmancs @anandMenon1 @drjennings @sarahobolt @jillongovt @Dannythefink
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What's in the EU-UK Brexit deal on energy?
It may be Boxing day, but I've had a quick look
Title VIII: Energy is the key section (page 156 onwards)
▶️ Standard stuff on commitment to competition, unbundling and customer choice
▶️ UK Capacity Market no longer needs to try to integrate overseas Capacity providers & vice versa
(Article ENER.6, Clause 3, page. 160)
2/
▶️ Existing "exemptions" for selected interconnectors will continue to apply.
This means that these interconnectors can continue to sell capacity rights ahead of time, rather than all through close to real-time markets.
(Article ENER.11, page 162)
3/
▶️ No network charges on individual interconnector transactions (as now)
▶️ But, UK cannot participate in EU procedures for capacity allocation and congestion management (more on this later)
(Article ENER.13, page 163)
4/
Gas trading: looks like the UK stays in the existing PRISMA gas trading platform.
Not my specialist area, but is this because PRISMA isn't an EU institution (unlike electricity market coupling)?
https://t.co/5GQJtZDpTa
(Article ENER. 15, page 164)
5/
It may be Boxing day, but I've had a quick look
Title VIII: Energy is the key section (page 156 onwards)
▶️ Standard stuff on commitment to competition, unbundling and customer choice
▶️ UK Capacity Market no longer needs to try to integrate overseas Capacity providers & vice versa
(Article ENER.6, Clause 3, page. 160)
2/

▶️ Existing "exemptions" for selected interconnectors will continue to apply.
This means that these interconnectors can continue to sell capacity rights ahead of time, rather than all through close to real-time markets.
(Article ENER.11, page 162)
3/

▶️ No network charges on individual interconnector transactions (as now)
▶️ But, UK cannot participate in EU procedures for capacity allocation and congestion management (more on this later)
(Article ENER.13, page 163)
4/

Gas trading: looks like the UK stays in the existing PRISMA gas trading platform.
Not my specialist area, but is this because PRISMA isn't an EU institution (unlike electricity market coupling)?
https://t.co/5GQJtZDpTa
(Article ENER. 15, page 164)
5/
Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
Both the @ChathamHouse and @Policy_Exchange reports are excellent and leave a healthy tension to the UK foreign policy debate. I\u2019m left with two questions that won\u2019t go away. Is the first underestimating how the world has changed. Is the second overestimating Britain\u2019s capacity?
— Ben Judah (@b_judah) January 11, 2021
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;