The fuel injected Brexiter comments on the EU's vaccine problems miss many points.
More from Brexit
Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
Both the @ChathamHouse and @Policy_Exchange reports are excellent and leave a healthy tension to the UK foreign policy debate. I\u2019m left with two questions that won\u2019t go away. Is the first underestimating how the world has changed. Is the second overestimating Britain\u2019s capacity?
— Ben Judah (@b_judah) January 11, 2021
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
A quote from this excellent piece, neatly summarising a core impact of Brexit.
The Commission’s view, according to several sources, is that Brexit means existing distribution networks and supply chains are now defunct and will have to be replaced by other systems.
Of course, this was never written on the side of a bus. And never acknowledged by government. Everything was meant to be broadly fine apart from the inevitable teething problems.
It was, however, visible from space to balanced observers. You did not have to be a trade specialist to understand that replacing the Single Market with a third country trade arrangement meant the end of many if not all of the complex arrangements optimised for the former.
In the absence of substantive mitigations, the Brexit winners are those who subscribe to some woolly notion of ‘sovereignty’ and those who did not like freedom of movement. The losers are everyone else.
But, of course, that’s not good enough. For understandable reasons Brexit was sold as a benefit not a cost. The trading benefits of freedom would far outweigh the costs. Divergence would benefit all.
The Commission’s view, according to several sources, is that Brexit means existing distribution networks and supply chains are now defunct and will have to be replaced by other systems.
Brexit reality bites: The new dawn of trade friction via @RTENews https://t.co/p6VdlhZUAN
— Tony Connelly (@tconnellyRTE) January 9, 2021
Of course, this was never written on the side of a bus. And never acknowledged by government. Everything was meant to be broadly fine apart from the inevitable teething problems.
It was, however, visible from space to balanced observers. You did not have to be a trade specialist to understand that replacing the Single Market with a third country trade arrangement meant the end of many if not all of the complex arrangements optimised for the former.
In the absence of substantive mitigations, the Brexit winners are those who subscribe to some woolly notion of ‘sovereignty’ and those who did not like freedom of movement. The losers are everyone else.
But, of course, that’s not good enough. For understandable reasons Brexit was sold as a benefit not a cost. The trading benefits of freedom would far outweigh the costs. Divergence would benefit all.
