The Next 20 Years
Just look around you in Nigeria, for example. 20 years ago, the ATM machine was a novelty. No bank issued debit cards- maybe just the foreign ones. There were no banking apps. You couldn't transfer funds the way we do now.
Which products or services will you invent or discover?
Will you be a spectator or a participant?
The next 10, 20 years will usher in new opportunities. Are you prepared?
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@Ayjchan @K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia @Ayjchan @K_G_Andersen please note that there were 11 infections in the Beijing 2004 leaks, not 8.
The 8 you are mentioning are for the main chain of infection with 3 levels from one primary case in April.
But there were 3 more primary cases for a total of 11 cases.
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia All were linked to the heavily contaminated CDC P3 lab (the top P3 in China at the time).
The cases are typically separated between:
- The February ones (Cui and Ren) which seem to have been covered up by the CDC Institute of Virology. Also we only have pseudonyms for these 2.
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia - The April ones-9 infections (1+8, officially the 'Beijing-Anhui Apr-2004 breakout'.
The official Chinese report only focussed on the April infections - keeping very quiet about the February ones. Here is the main April chain of infection.
Here is are the 9 from Apr 2004:
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia And here are the 9 people infected in Apr 2004:
(4-22 in the title -> April chain with alarm raised on the 22nd):
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia The WHO eventually correctly mentioned 11 cases:
https://t.co/a1HvuT0C8z
The 8 you are mentioning are for the main chain of infection with 3 levels from one primary case in April.
But there were 3 more primary cases for a total of 11 cases.
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia All were linked to the heavily contaminated CDC P3 lab (the top P3 in China at the time).
The cases are typically separated between:
- The February ones (Cui and Ren) which seem to have been covered up by the CDC Institute of Virology. Also we only have pseudonyms for these 2.
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia - The April ones-9 infections (1+8, officially the 'Beijing-Anhui Apr-2004 breakout'.
The official Chinese report only focussed on the April infections - keeping very quiet about the February ones. Here is the main April chain of infection.
Here is are the 9 from Apr 2004:
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia And here are the 9 people infected in Apr 2004:
(4-22 in the title -> April chain with alarm raised on the 22nd):
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia The WHO eventually correctly mentioned 11 cases:
https://t.co/a1HvuT0C8z
A quick thread on #Myitsone dam & #MyanmarChinaRelations in light of the SAC announcement that they would be restarting some stalled Chinese projects in Burma. This announcement has led to speculation about Myitsone, which has been suspended since 2011. Let’s go! ➡️ China has
consistently misunderstood & underestimated popular opposition to Myitsone. First and foremost, to the Burmese people, this is about the “mother river” of Burma - the Irrawaddy- and it’s nearly sacred importance to them as a lifeline of their country. This is what drove the
organic anti-dam movement that started locally in Kachin but +/- 2007 was effectively picked up & nationalized by Burmese environmental CSOs. Instead of understanding this, the Chinese lashed out and blamed the United States when Thein Sein suspended the project. I assure you
the USG was as surprised as China when the project was suspended. But China never believed it was truly the desire of the Burmese people that stopped the project. Today, the dam doesn’t make sense economically for Beijing & will definitely alienate Burmese, yet they stubbornly
continue to push it. Why? Let’s unpack a bit further. In addition to Myitsone, there were other campaigns & protests targeting Chinese projects such as Letpadaung copper mine & Kyaukphyu pipeline, port & SEZ. While these campaigns had varying levels off effect, none was as
Can\u2019t overstate how politically dangerous this is. As readers told me: a deeply unpopular regime pushing for deeply unpopular infrastructure projects. Not sure this is what Beijing wants either. https://t.co/TnlrgjPyxZ
— Thompson Chau (@tchau01) February 15, 2021
consistently misunderstood & underestimated popular opposition to Myitsone. First and foremost, to the Burmese people, this is about the “mother river” of Burma - the Irrawaddy- and it’s nearly sacred importance to them as a lifeline of their country. This is what drove the
organic anti-dam movement that started locally in Kachin but +/- 2007 was effectively picked up & nationalized by Burmese environmental CSOs. Instead of understanding this, the Chinese lashed out and blamed the United States when Thein Sein suspended the project. I assure you
the USG was as surprised as China when the project was suspended. But China never believed it was truly the desire of the Burmese people that stopped the project. Today, the dam doesn’t make sense economically for Beijing & will definitely alienate Burmese, yet they stubbornly
continue to push it. Why? Let’s unpack a bit further. In addition to Myitsone, there were other campaigns & protests targeting Chinese projects such as Letpadaung copper mine & Kyaukphyu pipeline, port & SEZ. While these campaigns had varying levels off effect, none was as