THREAD #Serbian #Orthodox #Church bishops start Conclave (#Sabor-Holy Assembly in #SPC parlance) to elect new #Patriarch, 3 months after previous died of #Covid. Election much more about politics than religion, mainly #Serbia #Kosovo relations but also #Russia Orthodox Church /2

2/ vs. #Ecumenical Patriarch of #Constantinople. Most of numerous traditional cleavages within SPC (Young Lions vs. Old Guards); Serbians vs. TransDrinians; ecumenicals vs. hardline Orthodox etc. will be irrelevant with only the split between Russian vs. Greek students, roughly/3
3/corresponding with main division: support for whatever "solution" President Vucic might propose to satisfy int'l demand to at least de facto recognize Kosovo vs. stubborn refusal to accept anything not in line with current Serbian constitution that says #KosovoJeSrbija. /4
4/Due to 3 decades of heavy politicking under 1 weak Patriarch (Pavle) & his insipid successor (Irinej), those who’d otherwise be God-obeying “good guys” are staunchly in Kosovo Status Quo camp, refusing any deal. Those bishops who were in bed with politicians & secret services/5
5/ now support “accommodation” with Kosovo. Voting system is peculiar: Conclave picks 3 eligible bishops (each needs to obtain simple majority of votes i.e. 23); names of top 3 are sealed & 1 is drawn. System was designed in Communist times to prevent manipulation. Both sides /6
6/have preferred candidates: "govt" Irinej of Novi Sad, unpleasant arrogant manipulator who has several minions that could take his place if he cannot make it into the 3 (Porfirije of Zagreb, slick cunning sweet-talking politician), Jefrem of Banja Luka etc. Anti-Vucic camp was/7
7/ fielding modernist, youthful, softspoken Grigorije whom hardliners tried to sideline moving him from Herzegovina to Germany in 2018. But he is not real candidate, only trailblazer for softer but also firm-in-refusal Teodosije of Kosovo. Last resort of this camp is Joanikije /8
8/of Nikšić, stubborn opponent of Montenegrin identity but also firmly against change of Kosovo status. Earmarked to succeed firebrand #Montenegro-Serb Amfilohije who succumbed to Covid, Joanikije would only step in as last ditch: if got to be elected patriarch, only 3 young & /9
9/ inexperienced Montenegrin-born bishops remain to assume Cetinje throne. Naming non-Montenegrin there would be asking for trouble & adding fuel to separatist tendencies, something Joanikije, all Constitutionalists & the reasonable faction of Irinej’s camp want to avoid. /10
10/Govt side can count on at least 18 certain votes; depending on concrete names it could muster up to 24-25 (23 needed). Opposition is certain of 20 & could reach 23-24. So voting will be tactical along some classic #Vatican #conclave patterns. Ideally both sides want to have/11
11/ 2 out of 3 in 2nd round to maximize chances (all 3 is practically impossible). If, as is to be expected, both sides give up their initial front runners, “gov't” might sacrifice Irinej to get Porfirije and/or Jefrem in; “opposition” would give up Grigorije hoping to boost /12
12/Teodosije and/or another candidate possibly Jovan of Slavonia. But if Irinej makes it in, rivals will be forced to push for Joanikije. In hardest-fought scenario both might have to compromise on 3rd candidate chosing 1 at least broadly acceptable to both camps and there lie/13
13/ the chances of Hrizostom of Sarajevo, Jovan of Šumadija or even some of the other backbenchers like Ignjatije, Justin, Irinej Dobrijević or Dositej. Once 3 names are in the 2nd round everything is possible (Church believes that Holy Spirit guides the hand picking winner). /14
14/ There is little chance for foul play as even losing ballots will be opened & revealed to the Conclave, unlike in 1990 when only the one with Pavle’s name was opened. Length of voting will be indicative: longer balloting is sign of a harder battle that may go on to Friday. END

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I'll bite, Mr. Gray. We can even play by your rather finicky rules.

Let's begin with some of the things you have said about Xinjiang, notably absent from your more recent media appearances, but still present in your blog about your 2014 biking trip.


The following is taken from an ongoing list I keep of people who have been to Xinjiang and written/spoken about their experiences. It is separate from the testimony of detainees and their relatives I also keep. Jerry is on this

Jerry, your article for CGTN, as well as your various Medium pieces, belabor themselves to emphasize the smoothness of your time in Xinjiang. Why did you leave out so many details from your log of your 2014 trip? They seem relevant.

For example, would CGTN not let you speak about Shanshan, the town that evidently disturbed you so much?


Why, pray tell, after noting how kind and hospitable Xinjiang police were to you in 2019 for CGTN—and how you were never told where you could or could not go—would you omit these details?
All the leftists in the comments like oh no prageru made a good point lol


Polls consistently show conservative support for nuclear energy. It also has high support among elites. The myth that it is unpopular in general isn’t true—although it is unpopular in almost every specific case where they need to site it

Article is old but yeah

This study finds that risk & benefit predict individual opinion the most, followed by the share of nuclear energy already extant, followed by ideology (conservatives support more)

This one finds that journalists attitude affect public perceptions, but that energy consultants, nuclear engineers, bureaucrats, and the military show the highest support for nuclear energy

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