"An early run of bad [or good!] luck...can produce dramatically different outcomes."
New Zealand had 277 separate introductions; only 19% of them led to more than 1 additional case.
IMHO, this article — https://t.co/wLiWDOZrvm — is an important corrective to fatalism about the new strain. As in, "welp, there are probably already at least a handful of cases of the new strain already here, so no matter what we do now, it's gonna spread." Not necessarily so.
"An early run of bad [or good!] luck...can produce dramatically different outcomes."
New Zealand had 277 separate introductions; only 19% of them led to more than 1 additional case.
* The new variant is here, with probably at least a handful of undetected cases.
* The new variant is so wildly contagious that, once it gains a foothold, cases WILL spike.
* Cases stopped rising steeply around Nov. 10 (by onset day).
1) New variant arrived in October or earlier, and helped cause our November spike. We then reined it in, without even realizing it was here.
2) New-variant community spread is low-level thus far, at least thru ~Xmas. No superspreaders yet.
If it's #2, tho, we might still be at a VERY high-variance moment
Again, I'm skeptical. But this would be the optimistic scenario.
More from For later read
The common understanding of propaganda is that it is intended to brainwash the masses. Supposedly, people get exposed to the same message repeatedly and over time come to believe in whatever nonsense authoritarians want them to believe /1
And yet authoritarians often broadcast silly, unpersuasive propaganda.
Political scientist Haifeng Huang writes that the purpose of propaganda is not to brainwash people, but to instill fear in them /2
When people are bombarded with propaganda everywhere they look, they are reminded of the strength of the regime.
The vast amount of resources authoritarians spend to display their message in every corner of the public square is a costly demonstration of their power /3
In fact, the overt silliness of authoritarian propaganda is part of the point. Propaganda is designed to be silly so that people can instantly recognize it when they see it
Propaganda is intended to instill fear in people, not brainwash them.
The message is: You might not believe in pro-regime values or attitudes. But we will make sure you are too frightened to do anything about it.
And yet authoritarians often broadcast silly, unpersuasive propaganda.
Political scientist Haifeng Huang writes that the purpose of propaganda is not to brainwash people, but to instill fear in them /2
"propaganda is often not used for indoctrination, but rather to signal the government\u2019s strength in being able to afford significant resources and impose on its citizens...not meant to 'brainwash', but rather to forewarn the society about how strong it is" https://t.co/mFAurhEHeO pic.twitter.com/WXKKJaPqWQ
— Rob Henderson (@robkhenderson) June 18, 2020
When people are bombarded with propaganda everywhere they look, they are reminded of the strength of the regime.
The vast amount of resources authoritarians spend to display their message in every corner of the public square is a costly demonstration of their power /3
In fact, the overt silliness of authoritarian propaganda is part of the point. Propaganda is designed to be silly so that people can instantly recognize it when they see it
Authoritarians do not use propaganda for brainwashing, "but to demonstrate their strength in social control...propaganda may need to be dull and unpersuasive, to make sure citizens know it is propaganda when they see it and hence get the implicit message" https://t.co/PqRpxjaIPL pic.twitter.com/1y67d2RCjB
— Rob Henderson (@robkhenderson) June 19, 2020
Propaganda is intended to instill fear in people, not brainwash them.
The message is: You might not believe in pro-regime values or attitudes. But we will make sure you are too frightened to do anything about it.
Excited we finally have a draft of this paper, which attempts to provide a 'unifying theory' of the long economic divergence between the Middle East & Western Europe
As we see it, there are 3 recent theories that hit on important aspects of the divergence...
1/
One set of theories focus on the legitimating power of Islam (Rubin, @prof_ahmetkuru, Platteau). This gave religious clerics greater power, which pulled political resources away form those encouraging economic development
But these theories leave some questions unanswered...
2/
Religious legitimacy is only effective if people
care what religious authorities dictate. Given the economic consequences, why do people remain religious, and thereby render religious legitimacy effective? Is religiosity a cause or a consequence of institutional arrangements?
3/
Another set of theories focus on the religious proscriptions of Islam, particular those associated with Islamic law (@timurkuran). These laws were appropriate for the setting they formed but had unforeseeable consequences and failed to change as economic circumstances changed
4/
There are unaddressed questions here, too
Muslim rulers must have understood that Islamic law carried proscriptions that hampered economic development. Why, then, did they continue to use Islamic institutions (like courts) that promoted inefficiencies?
5/
As we see it, there are 3 recent theories that hit on important aspects of the divergence...
1/
New CEPR Discussion Paper - DP15802
— CEPR (@cepr_org) February 14, 2021
Culture, Institutions & the Long Divergence@albertobisin @nyuniversity, Jared Rubin @jaredcrubin @ChapmanU, Avner Seror @SerorAvner @amseaixmars @univamu, Thierry Verdier @PSEinfohttps://t.co/lhs6AJb7jE#CEPR_DE, #CEPR_EH, #CEPR_ITRE pic.twitter.com/FtMzAELljJ
One set of theories focus on the legitimating power of Islam (Rubin, @prof_ahmetkuru, Platteau). This gave religious clerics greater power, which pulled political resources away form those encouraging economic development
But these theories leave some questions unanswered...
2/
Religious legitimacy is only effective if people
care what religious authorities dictate. Given the economic consequences, why do people remain religious, and thereby render religious legitimacy effective? Is religiosity a cause or a consequence of institutional arrangements?
3/
Another set of theories focus on the religious proscriptions of Islam, particular those associated with Islamic law (@timurkuran). These laws were appropriate for the setting they formed but had unforeseeable consequences and failed to change as economic circumstances changed
4/
There are unaddressed questions here, too
Muslim rulers must have understood that Islamic law carried proscriptions that hampered economic development. Why, then, did they continue to use Islamic institutions (like courts) that promoted inefficiencies?
5/
