▶️ Standard stuff on commitment to competition, unbundling and customer choice
▶️ UK Capacity Market no longer needs to try to integrate overseas Capacity providers & vice versa
(Article ENER.6, Clause 3, page. 160)
2/
What's in the EU-UK Brexit deal on energy?
It may be Boxing day, but I've had a quick look
▶️ Standard stuff on commitment to competition, unbundling and customer choice
▶️ UK Capacity Market no longer needs to try to integrate overseas Capacity providers & vice versa
(Article ENER.6, Clause 3, page. 160)
2/
This means that these interconnectors can continue to sell capacity rights ahead of time, rather than all through close to real-time markets.
(Article ENER.11, page 162)
3/
▶️ But, UK cannot participate in EU procedures for capacity allocation and congestion management (more on this later)
(Article ENER.13, page 163)
4/
Not my specialist area, but is this because PRISMA isn't an EU institution (unlike electricity market coupling)?
https://t.co/5GQJtZDpTa
(Article ENER. 15, page 164)
5/
▶️ Security of Supply: Parties to cooperate, again not much detail. Can't see any references to a solidarity principle.
(Articles ENER. 16 and ENER. 17, page 165)
6/
- UK TSOs (i.e. National Grid) to cooperate with EU TSOs through cooperation with ENTSO-E and ENTSOG but not membership
- UK regulator (@Ofgem) to cooperate with EU regulators through ACER. Again, no UK membership
(Articles ENER.19+20)
7/
Looks like UK no longer a member of North Seas Energy Cooperation, so a new forum is needed.
(Article ENER 23, page 169-170).
See summary of our report on Future of North Sea :
https://t.co/Qgh8b2p0yZ
8/
THREAD: New @Policy_Exchange report \u201cThe Future of the North Sea: Maximising the contribution of the North Sea to Net Zero and Levelling Up\u201d by me, @benmcaleenan and @ed_birkett, foreword by Tees Valley Mayor @benhouchen. Key takeaways of the report: /1https://t.co/l0r46nKjmk
— Will Nicolle (@WRNicolle) November 3, 2020
Title on Energy ceases on 30 June 2026. Although can be extended to 31 March 2027 & again to 31 March 2028.
Seems linked to general termination provisions of the deal, including a reference to 🐟🐟 (Article FISH.17)
(ENER 33, p.172)
9/
Market coupling ceases on 1 Jan 2021. Will be replaced by April'22 with "Multi-region loose volume coupling"
New term for many https://t.co/oSVDDiWFw9
Annex ENER-4 p.784
10/
Creates a risk that interconnectors flow the "wrong way" (i.e. from high prices to low prices).
Algorithm is separate to EU day-ahead market coupling (EUPHEMIA)
11/
▶️ By April 2021: CBA and outline technical proposals
▶️ By November 2021: Technical proposals
▶️ By April 2022: System starts operating
p.785
12/
▶️ New Specialised Committee on Energy to discuss/implement some bits of the energy title and annexes (page 12)
▶️ Commitment to carbon pricing in the section on "level playing field"
[Title XI, Article 7.3, page 202]
13/
▶️ Lots of sensible provisions, much to gain for both sides
▶️ Market coupling will be weaker, even with new system (Apr 2022)
▶️ Welcome focus on North Sea
▶️ Need to understand more on termination provisions
See more in our recent paper:
https://t.co/KEXNIWvAHJ
14/14
THREAD: The key takeaways from our new @Policy_Exchange report: "The Future of UK-EU Energy Cooperation."
— Ed Birkett (@ed_birkett) September 28, 2020
1/8https://t.co/nfJFdO4GBY
More from Brexit
Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
Both the @ChathamHouse and @Policy_Exchange reports are excellent and leave a healthy tension to the UK foreign policy debate. I\u2019m left with two questions that won\u2019t go away. Is the first underestimating how the world has changed. Is the second overestimating Britain\u2019s capacity?
— Ben Judah (@b_judah) January 11, 2021
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
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First update to https://t.co/lDdqjtKTZL since the challenge ended – Medium links!! Go add your Medium profile now 👀📝 (thanks @diannamallen for the suggestion 😁)
Just added Telegram links to https://t.co/lDdqjtKTZL too! Now you can provide a nice easy way for people to message you :)
Less than 1 hour since I started adding stuff to https://t.co/lDdqjtKTZL again, and profile pages are now responsive!!! 🥳 Check it out -> https://t.co/fVkEL4fu0L
Accounts page is now also responsive!! 📱✨
💪 I managed to make the whole site responsive in about an hour. On my roadmap I had it down as 4-5 hours!!! 🤘🤠🤘
Just added Telegram links to https://t.co/lDdqjtKTZL too! Now you can provide a nice easy way for people to message you :)
Less than 1 hour since I started adding stuff to https://t.co/lDdqjtKTZL again, and profile pages are now responsive!!! 🥳 Check it out -> https://t.co/fVkEL4fu0L
Accounts page is now also responsive!! 📱✨
💪 I managed to make the whole site responsive in about an hour. On my roadmap I had it down as 4-5 hours!!! 🤘🤠🤘
1/ Some initial thoughts on personal moats:
Like company moats, your personal moat should be a competitive advantage that is not only durable—it should also compound over time.
Characteristics of a personal moat below:
2/ Like a company moat, you want to build career capital while you sleep.
As Andrew Chen noted:
3/ You don’t want to build a competitive advantage that is fleeting or that will get commoditized
Things that might get commoditized over time (some longer than
4/ Before the arrival of recorded music, what used to be scarce was the actual music itself — required an in-person artist.
After recorded music, the music itself became abundant and what became scarce was curation, distribution, and self space.
5/ Similarly, in careers, what used to be (more) scarce were things like ideas, money, and exclusive relationships.
In the internet economy, what has become scarce are things like specific knowledge, rare & valuable skills, and great reputations.
Like company moats, your personal moat should be a competitive advantage that is not only durable—it should also compound over time.
Characteristics of a personal moat below:
I'm increasingly interested in the idea of "personal moats" in the context of careers.
— Erik Torenberg (@eriktorenberg) November 22, 2018
Moats should be:
- Hard to learn and hard to do (but perhaps easier for you)
- Skills that are rare and valuable
- Legible
- Compounding over time
- Unique to your own talents & interests https://t.co/bB3k1YcH5b
2/ Like a company moat, you want to build career capital while you sleep.
As Andrew Chen noted:
People talk about \u201cpassive income\u201d a lot but not about \u201cpassive social capital\u201d or \u201cpassive networking\u201d or \u201cpassive knowledge gaining\u201d but that\u2019s what you can architect if you have a thing and it grows over time without intensive constant effort to sustain it
— Andrew Chen (@andrewchen) November 22, 2018
3/ You don’t want to build a competitive advantage that is fleeting or that will get commoditized
Things that might get commoditized over time (some longer than
Things that look like moats but likely aren\u2019t or may fade:
— Erik Torenberg (@eriktorenberg) November 22, 2018
- Proprietary networks
- Being something other than one of the best at any tournament style-game
- Many "awards"
- Twitter followers or general reach without "respect"
- Anything that depends on information asymmetry https://t.co/abjxesVIh9
4/ Before the arrival of recorded music, what used to be scarce was the actual music itself — required an in-person artist.
After recorded music, the music itself became abundant and what became scarce was curation, distribution, and self space.
5/ Similarly, in careers, what used to be (more) scarce were things like ideas, money, and exclusive relationships.
In the internet economy, what has become scarce are things like specific knowledge, rare & valuable skills, and great reputations.
