EU views PMs letter accompanying his formal #Brexit extension request - saying that he doesn’t actually want an extension- as a gimmick aimed at a domestic audience. As far as EU law is concerned: a formal request from the UK prime minister, is a formal request full stop /1

THREAD: Here are the essential points from the EU's time-limited, limited effect no-deal Brexit mitigation offer.

(Most concessions are unilateral measures it will implement. Some require UK cooperation - not clear what happens if we refuse to do

Air travel
"Unless there is a contingency measure in place on air transport at the end of the transition period, air traffic between the EU and the United Kingdom will be interrupted."

The EU is proposing 6 months of reciprocal concessions to keep (most) planes flying.

However, they're not offering any concessions on airline ownership requirements, so BA for one may come unstuck here (depending on how its restructured shareholding is going). Its message: you already had plenty of time to prepare, including a grace period.

Road transport

A) Haulage
With no agreement, hauliers would have to use ECMT permits to provide any freight transport between the UK and the EU. But there aren't nearly enough of those to go around. So they're giving a basic grace period of 6 months, as long as we reciprocate.

B) Bus services
"Furthermore, in the absence of an agreement on a future partnership between the EU and the United Kingdom by 1 January 2021, regular bus services to and from the United
Kingdom would have to be interrupted"

Here too, offer is 6 months of continued connectivity.

Your regular reminder that Brexit is going badly because the UK has still to decide what the purpose of leaving the EU is

1/

#EUref came about as piece of party mgt by Cameron, rather than as culmination of considered and structured debate about UK's place in the world

2/

Yes, we talked a lot (A LOT) about 'Europe' and the EU, but primarily as a function of lots of other things

A touchstone of dissent, if you will (h/t @PaulAdamTaggart)

3/

Referendum campaigns on both sides were simply about getting people to vote their way, not efforts to set out settled plans of What Comes Next

"Vote for us and everything will be dandy" is not a plan

4/

That might have been alright if post-vote there had been a national discussion on how to proceed in an inclusive manner, but instead the political logic pointed to trying to capture the meaning of it all to serve particular agendas

All very majoritarian, as per

5/

It's OUT! My latest #Brexit Briefing for @FinancialTimes - examining @BorisJohnson
"buy now, pay later" Northern Ireland Protocol, why the EU-UK trust deficit is killing it, how that can be restored - because it needs to work. /1

@BorisJohnson The danger here is that lingering animus over the opportunistic nature Johnson's Faustian bargain - dividing his Kingdom in order to 'get #Brexit done' and win an 80-seat majority - is clouding judgement on both sides of the Channel /2

@BorisJohnson The facts of the Protocol are no less true for Johnson's constant denial of them - that there would be checks, that there really is a trade border that now prevents plants and pets from travelling freely from Bedford to Ballymena as M.Gove reminds us. But these are other facts/3

@BorisJohnson Firstly, NI remains part of UK, even if it is now has EU customs rules.

Secondly, NI remains politically divided and fragile; the Good Friday Agreement is a constant work in progress.

Thirdly, both the EU and the UK agreed to this unsatisfactory arrangement jointly. /4

@BorisJohnson Fourthly, therefore, they have a joint responsibility to make it work because

Fifthly - and most importantly — there is no alternative to it. /5

This is the second time in one week that I have to engage with something written by a British academic on their assessment of Brexit & Ireland. In this case @HelenHet20 in @NewStatesman 🧵

1. @HelenHet20 Europe’s vaccine crisis has revealed the true nature of the EU?? Ireland has been a member state since 1973, has had more refs on EU topics than any other country & thus its political & administrative elite knows & understands EU @BrigidLaffan

2. Said elite & electorate never idealised EU-small states are acutely aware of limits of their power & deploy capacity with care-the Swedes coined the term smart states. Small states understand they have to be smart. @BrigidLaffan

3. Since 24th of June 2016 Ireland has been shown unstinting solidarity from 26 EU states & EU institutions. During this time, its nearest neighbour tried to power it off the diplomatic pitch & kept thinking that It could peel Ireland off from EU solidarity. @BrigidLaffan

4. On the vaccine debacle & it was one the lesson the Irish will take is that having a seat at the table & voice matters-it took an Irish Taoiseach & Foreign Minister a couple of hours to sort this out. @BrigidLaffan

1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

2/ It highlights, as a win, that China’s preservation of existing liberalizations. That’s positive, but not really a big problem; the bigger issue is stagnation, where reform pledges have failed to materialize after years/decades of promises. Great example is in the FDI openings,

3/ which are highlighted to include cloud, auto, fin services etc—all areas of EU/MNC interest. Thing is, these openings aren’t new. China has begun opening auto/finance since 2018/19, while the 50% cap on cloud services has remained unchanged since 2015 (or before if we consider

4/ WTO ascension commitments vs the 2015 Telecom Catalogue, but that’s for another day). So these are existing openings that are repackaged as “wins.” More critical issue beyond FDI caps is around licensing issuance, which still big problem. Arguably some more significance in

5/ R&D and health? Not an expert, but the FDI conditions (eg hospitals only in certain cities) are limiting, while R&D could be complicated by data/info controls. It’s also unclear how existing tech transfer prohibitions exceed existing protections in the foreign investment law,