Texans are waiting for a solution to a preventable problem.
Or, you could let us know when you figure out why it was trending yesterday and the users are complaining which is why Vice wrote about it. Why I'm saying what I am.
There's an assumption here that this problem is fixed bc it was already hacked.
It's not.
Let us know when you've found the supply chain hack that's already there
— SleeplessOrphan (@sleeplessorphan) February 20, 2021
Texans are waiting for a solution to a preventable problem.
The assumption that bc SOME farmers said screw this and used hacked firmware to get around that obstacle doesn't mean that all farmers are doing that.
Of course no one has pointed out that another issue here is that no one at John Deere has figured out they don't have enough staff to quickly and reliably SOLVE problems.
By not giving people a fast solution they're causing this and other issues.
So what I'm saying is somebody at John Deere needs to examine all of this.
There's a lot of clues and past examples of big situations like this that have been handled poorly from the start and took a very long time to fix.
But they do every damn day.
More from Internet
SolarWinds follow up. Very good tweet explaining what happened.
Basically what this means is that SolarWinds itself was exploited. Someone posted an infected update as legitimate (digitally signed), leading customers to download a bad update.
“Multiple trojanized updates were digitally signed from March - May 2020 and posted to the SolarWinds updates website” https://t.co/8e3bMFWXYu
FireEye then explains that infected organizations were approached and exploited. This is a separate Step 2.
At this point, information is already going to “malicious domains” without extra intervention, after the malware does nothing for “up to two weeks”
Hackers reportedly slipped malware into prior SolarWinds software updates, which gave them access to a "God-mode" for infected networks, including the Treasury and Commerce departments.
— Wes Wilson (@weswilson4) December 14, 2020
The Pentagon is also a SolarWinds customer.https://t.co/Srcoztssol https://t.co/OgMhAjJqPx
Basically what this means is that SolarWinds itself was exploited. Someone posted an infected update as legitimate (digitally signed), leading customers to download a bad update.
“Multiple trojanized updates were digitally signed from March - May 2020 and posted to the SolarWinds updates website” https://t.co/8e3bMFWXYu
FireEye then explains that infected organizations were approached and exploited. This is a separate Step 2.
At this point, information is already going to “malicious domains” without extra intervention, after the malware does nothing for “up to two weeks”
Well, this should be a depressing read -- notably because the UK and the US are both terrible when it comes to data protection, but the UK appears to be getting a pass. So much for 'adequacy'.
A few initial thoughts on the Draft Decision on UK Adequacy: https://t.co/ncAqc93UFm
The decision goes into great detail about the state of the UK surveillance system, and notably, "bulk acquisition" of data, and I think I get their argument. /1
For one, while the UK allows similar "bulk powers," it differs from the US regime both in terms of proportionality, oversight, and even notice. Some of this came about after the Privacy International case in 2019 (Privacy International) v Investigatory
Powers Tribunal [2019]) /2
Whereas, other bits were already baked in by virtue of the fact that the Human Rights Act is a thing (This concept doesn't exist in the US; rather we hand-wave about the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and then selectively apply it) /3
For example, UK bulk surveillance (I'm keeping this broad, but the draft policy breaksk it down), substantially limits collection to three agencies: MI5, MI6, and GHCQ). By contrast, it's a bit of a free-for-all in the US, where varying policies /4
At least we have a draft of the adequacy decision. I haven't read it yet, mostly because I'm afraid I'll be disappointed that it doesn't address the UK's penchant for surveillance. https://t.co/puJiVET2SJ
— Don Edwards (@DMEdwards) February 20, 2021
A few initial thoughts on the Draft Decision on UK Adequacy: https://t.co/ncAqc93UFm
The decision goes into great detail about the state of the UK surveillance system, and notably, "bulk acquisition" of data, and I think I get their argument. /1
For one, while the UK allows similar "bulk powers," it differs from the US regime both in terms of proportionality, oversight, and even notice. Some of this came about after the Privacy International case in 2019 (Privacy International) v Investigatory
Powers Tribunal [2019]) /2
Whereas, other bits were already baked in by virtue of the fact that the Human Rights Act is a thing (This concept doesn't exist in the US; rather we hand-wave about the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and then selectively apply it) /3
For example, UK bulk surveillance (I'm keeping this broad, but the draft policy breaksk it down), substantially limits collection to three agencies: MI5, MI6, and GHCQ). By contrast, it's a bit of a free-for-all in the US, where varying policies /4