Reality: This is false. Most human rights groups are calling for targeted measures directed solely at the military of Myanmar and companies it owns and which give revenue directly to it.
With Myanmar, it seems that some are raising questions about the efficacy of sanctions and concerns about unintended consequences. It’s time for a “Myth and Realities” guide. THREAD. #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar

Reality: This is false. Most human rights groups are calling for targeted measures directed solely at the military of Myanmar and companies it owns and which give revenue directly to it.
Reality: There are all kinds of ways to prevent unintended consequences on the broader Myanmar economy.
Reality: Sanctions are not just about assets. Sanctions imposed by the US Treasury, UK, the EU, and other jurisdictions, have extremely broad international consequences.



Reality: Myanmar economy is fundamentally different than it was under previous junta rule. Myanmar’s economic situation is not the same as it was during previous periods of junta rule.

https://t.co/CaTPrasbsu
#WhatsHappeningInMyanmar
More from For later read
Excited we finally have a draft of this paper, which attempts to provide a 'unifying theory' of the long economic divergence between the Middle East & Western Europe
As we see it, there are 3 recent theories that hit on important aspects of the divergence...
1/
One set of theories focus on the legitimating power of Islam (Rubin, @prof_ahmetkuru, Platteau). This gave religious clerics greater power, which pulled political resources away form those encouraging economic development
But these theories leave some questions unanswered...
2/
Religious legitimacy is only effective if people
care what religious authorities dictate. Given the economic consequences, why do people remain religious, and thereby render religious legitimacy effective? Is religiosity a cause or a consequence of institutional arrangements?
3/
Another set of theories focus on the religious proscriptions of Islam, particular those associated with Islamic law (@timurkuran). These laws were appropriate for the setting they formed but had unforeseeable consequences and failed to change as economic circumstances changed
4/
There are unaddressed questions here, too
Muslim rulers must have understood that Islamic law carried proscriptions that hampered economic development. Why, then, did they continue to use Islamic institutions (like courts) that promoted inefficiencies?
5/
As we see it, there are 3 recent theories that hit on important aspects of the divergence...
1/
New CEPR Discussion Paper - DP15802
— CEPR (@cepr_org) February 14, 2021
Culture, Institutions & the Long Divergence@albertobisin @nyuniversity, Jared Rubin @jaredcrubin @ChapmanU, Avner Seror @SerorAvner @amseaixmars @univamu, Thierry Verdier @PSEinfohttps://t.co/lhs6AJb7jE#CEPR_DE, #CEPR_EH, #CEPR_ITRE pic.twitter.com/FtMzAELljJ
One set of theories focus on the legitimating power of Islam (Rubin, @prof_ahmetkuru, Platteau). This gave religious clerics greater power, which pulled political resources away form those encouraging economic development
But these theories leave some questions unanswered...
2/
Religious legitimacy is only effective if people
care what religious authorities dictate. Given the economic consequences, why do people remain religious, and thereby render religious legitimacy effective? Is religiosity a cause or a consequence of institutional arrangements?
3/
Another set of theories focus on the religious proscriptions of Islam, particular those associated with Islamic law (@timurkuran). These laws were appropriate for the setting they formed but had unforeseeable consequences and failed to change as economic circumstances changed
4/
There are unaddressed questions here, too
Muslim rulers must have understood that Islamic law carried proscriptions that hampered economic development. Why, then, did they continue to use Islamic institutions (like courts) that promoted inefficiencies?
5/
the whole point of Dunks was you could go cop them at VIM whenever you wanted for $65. this shit is like having to enter a raffle to buy milk.
like seriously why not make a ton more of them if they're gonna be so sought-after? they land at outlets? so? nike still makes money off that.
the only reason to keep making them so limited is that they KNOW all that matters is the profit on the flip and if they were readily available FEWER people would want them, not more
the whole system is super broken, but it's just gonna go the way it goes, because at this point it all caters to the secondary market. the only reason Nike can sell Jordan 1s for $200 is because the people buying them can flip them for $500
adjusted for inflation, a $65 AJ1 in 1985 is like $160—and modern-day AJ1s are made from cheaper materials in factories staffed by cheaper workers. they don't HAVE to be $200 retail. but the secondary market nuked the whole concept of what sneakers are "worth"
\U0001f91e ONLINE RAFFLE is available from @bodega for the upcoming "UNLV" Nike Dunk Low Retro. Open until 5 PM ET on 2/16.
— Kicks Deals (@KicksDeals) February 15, 2021
\u27a1\ufe0f\u27a1\ufe0f https://t.co/JxJlyPuJVo pic.twitter.com/zenWOCDg4L
like seriously why not make a ton more of them if they're gonna be so sought-after? they land at outlets? so? nike still makes money off that.
the only reason to keep making them so limited is that they KNOW all that matters is the profit on the flip and if they were readily available FEWER people would want them, not more
the whole system is super broken, but it's just gonna go the way it goes, because at this point it all caters to the secondary market. the only reason Nike can sell Jordan 1s for $200 is because the people buying them can flip them for $500
adjusted for inflation, a $65 AJ1 in 1985 is like $160—and modern-day AJ1s are made from cheaper materials in factories staffed by cheaper workers. they don't HAVE to be $200 retail. but the secondary market nuked the whole concept of what sneakers are "worth"