Some math on SF's Prop C:

Current SF spending on homelessness: $380M
Projected revenue from Prop C: $300M
Number of SF homeless: 7,500

Post-C, that means SF will be spending $90k/homeless person.

That's $30K per year *more* than the median SF teacher salary.

I don't get SF.

Note that despite that massive spending, SF has one of the lowest 'sheltered rate' among big US cities. SF homeless isn't particularly high, per capita, but more of them are on the street than elsewhere (which is why the problem looks bad).
Within that context, Prop C is a vote to spend even more, to the point the city is paying (per homeless person) just under what Google pays (in cash) to new college hires. And yet these people are on the street somehow.
I don't claim to understand the dizzyingly complex urban policy issues around homelessness. But neither do most SF taxpayers, and I think they'd like to know just how we got here.
For some coverage on Prop C (where I got the spend numbers from):

https://t.co/PaYqNHp3OB
SF does a bi-annual 'homeless census' apparently. Numbers come from the 2017 version. Links below.

https://t.co/NTjWoz6awk
https://t.co/WHlYLajcMR
As a final note, this very simple and high-level number came out of reading @stripe's position on it, which calculated the cost per SF resident. I thought per homeless person would be more interesting (though again, a very crude take on the economics).

https://t.co/o3p6K5DfdB
Really finally, muting thread. Didn't expect this to attract so much interest, and I've got nothing more to add than what's in this thread.

Sadly (or perhaps not), SF isn't really top of mind, as I neither really live, vote, or pay taxes there anymore. Best of luck, SF.

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